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The buyer-seller watermarking protocol enables a seller to successfully identify a traitor from a pirated copy, while preventing the
seller from framing an innocent buyer. Based on finite field theory and the homomorphic property of public key cryptosystems
such as RSA, several buyer-seller watermarking protocols (N. Memon and P. W. Wong (2001) and C.-L. Lei et al. (2004)) have
been proposed previously. However, those protocols require not only large computational power but also substantial network
bandwidth. In this paper, we introduce a new buyer-seller protocol that overcomes those weaknesses by managing the watermarks.
Compared with the earlier protocols, ours is n times faster in terms of computation, where n is the number of watermark elements,
while incurring only O(1/lN ) times communication overhead given the finite field parameter lN . In addition, the quality of the
watermarked image generated with our method is better, using the same watermark strength.
Copyright © 2008 Y. Wu and H. Pang. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of computer networks and increased
use of multimedia data via the Internet have resulted in
fast and convenient exchange of digital information. With
the ease of editing and perfect reproduction, the protection
of ownership of digital audio, image and video materials
become an important concern. Copyright marking [1]
is a relatively new technique for hiding information in
multimedia content with the aim of tracing any traitor who
redistributes the content illegally. Its application is broad, for
instance, copyright protection [2–4].
In general, a watermarking scheme for traitor tracing (a
traitor is a legitimate buyer who subsequently distributes his
copy illegally) involves three steps: first, an owner embeds
into a cover image a watermark that identifies the buyer.
Secondly, if a suspicious image is found, the owner will
detect the watermark in the image. Once the watermark
of a specific buyer is identified, the owner will take the
case to a court. Finally, the authority will independently
detect the watermark again in the image in question. If the
watermark is really found, the traitor is confirmed. A number
of watermarking protocols have been proposed in [5–9] to
track down the distributors of illegal replicas.
However, the accusation against the charged distributor,
who was the buyer in some earlier transaction, could be
objectionable because the seller also has access to the
watermarked copies and, hence, is able to release such a
replica on his own to frame the distributor.
To solve the customer’s right problem [10] in the
arbitration phase, Memon and Wong [11] proposed an
interactive buyer-seller protocol (hereafter referred to as MW
protocol) for invisible watermarking. In the protocol, the
seller does not know the watermark of the buyer, so the seller
cannot create copies of the protected content containing the
buyer’s watermark. After the seller finds an unauthorized
copy, the seller can identify the buyer from a watermark in
the unauthorized copy, and furthermore the seller can prove
this fact to a third party using a dispute resolution protocol.
This prevents the buyer from claiming that the unauthorized
copy may have originated from the seller himself. Memon
and Wong proposed two embodiments in [11, 12] based on
RSA [13] and ElGamal [14] crytosystems, respectively.
As explained in [15], Memon’s protocol has a weakness in
that the seller can frame a buyer with a higher-value image;
this is known as unbinding problem in [15]. To rectify the
problem, Lei et al. proposed another buyer-seller protocol
(called LYTC protocol hereinafter), which inserts a second
watermark into the cover image. The second watermark
is generated by a watermark certification authority (WCA)
and sent to the buyer securely. As further observed in [15,
page 1620], “the protocol (note: [11]) restricts itself to the use
2 Advances in Multimedia
of linear watermarking schemes and, hence, provides limited
flexibility in practice.” However, Lei et al. did not propose
any nonlinear method that would have allowed them to
replace the asymmetric cipher in their protocol with a much
cheaper symmetric cipher. Zhang et al. [16] enhanced the
previous buyer-seller schemes with the same computational
complexity so as to defeat malicious arbitrator. Recently,
Zhao et al. [17] follow the footprint of MW scheme. It is
not clear whether it is possible to design a nonlinear scheme
because the popular/standard asymmetric cryptosystems are
in finite fields. For example, other buyer-seller schemes such
as [18] also employ asymmetric cipher. Hence the cover
image has to be separated and encrypted independently in
the previous schemes.
Neither MW nor LYTC is eﬃcient in terms of compu-
tation cost and communication overhead, because a lot of
asymmetric cipher operations are performed. As the buyer-
seller protocol may be employed in an online application,
for example a paid Internet image gallery, response time is
important to user retention. In particular, the buyer may be
using a mobile device that has only limited computing power,
battery life, and/or communication bandwidth. Therefore, to
be feasible in practice, an alternative light-weight buyer-seller
protocol is needed.
Kuribayashi and Tanaka [19] proposed an anonymous
fingerprinting that improves the enciphering rate with
interactive Zero-knowledge proof. But it is computationally
intensive and bandwidth ineﬃcient.
In our proposed protocol, the seller asks a WCA to
generate two independent watermarks W and ̂W, where
W is used for identifying the buyer at the WCA side. Let
V = W + β̂W where β is a predefined parameter to ensure
frame-proof. V is for the seller securely while ̂W is for the
buyer securely. To be able to identify the buyer with V at
the seller side, the seller embeds V into the cover image
to produce a watermarked image. The buyer obtains the
watermarked image which she watermarks again with (β̂W);
this eﬀectively reverses out β̂W and leaves the final copy that
is watermarked with W. The identification step is the same as
that in [5]. While the proposed protocol may look similar to
multiwatermarking schemes (e.g., [20, 21]) at first sight, our
scheme is really diﬀerent from them in nature. Specifically,
the watermarks in multiwatermarking are independent and
all the watermarked images are of high quality. In contrast,
the watermarks V and ̂W in our scheme are dependent, and
only the final watermarked copy derived by the buyer is of
high quality since one watermark alleviates the eﬀect of the
other.
The reminder of this paper is as follows. Section 2
elaborates on our protocol. Section 3 analyzes the protocol
in terms of frame deterrence, performance comparison,
and so forth. Section 4 describes experiment results. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. THE PROPOSED BUYER-SELLER PROTOCOL
Denote the original image as X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and the
watermarks for identifying a buyer as W = {w1,w2, . . . ,wn}
and ̂W = {ŵ1, ŵ2, . . . , ŵn}, where n is the number of image
elements (e.g., DCT coeﬃcients) to be manipulated. Our
protocol is a light-weight buyer-seller watermarking scheme
that focuses on managing the watermarks. We do not design
a new embedding method, but simply employ a state-of-the-
art scheme for embedding the watermarks. In particular, the
robust watermarking method Add-embedding in [5] is used
for illustrating our proposed solution
yi = xi + αwi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,n, (1)
where α is the watermark strength relating to watermark
robustness and invisibility. Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yn} is the
watermarked image.
2.1. Trust model
In our protocol, the trust model is the same as that
in MW and LYTC. There are three participants: seller,
buyer, and WCA. The seller may attempt to frame an
innocent buyer with an image that is embedded with the
buyer’s watermark (customer’s right problem), or frame
a traitor with a higher-value image (unbinding problem.
( unbinding problem: when a pirated copy is found
and the illegal distributor is identified, a higher-value
image enables the seller to seek much higher compensa-
tion from the illegal distributor.) The buyer may attempt
to disseminate her legal copy without being identified
(traitor tracing problem). In addition, the WCA, who
is a trusted third party, is assumed to manage the watermarks
secretly in the process of watermark generation, storage,
delivery, and arbitration.
We also assume that the watermarks are independent and
normalized. That is to say, for any pair of watermarks W1
and W2, W1•W2 = 0 if W1 /=W2, otherwise 1, where • is the
correlation operator (i.e., inner product).
For simplicity, for the rest of this paper we assume that
all the communication messages are authentic and that the
cover signal is an image.
2.2. Watermarking protocol
In the watermarking process, the original image is doubly-
watermarked with the watermarks generated from a WCA.
Figure 1 summarizes the message flows in the watermarking
process.
(1) Acting on information such as advertisement or the
seller’s website, the buyer B decides to purchase an image.
She thus sends a request for the image.
(2) The seller S generates a fingerprint hS from the
original image from the features of original image X (e.g.,
[22]). He then forwards the request of the buyer along with
hS to a WCA.
(3) The WCA generates two independent watermark
sequences W and ̂W based on hS and buyer’s description.
Let V = W + β̂W, where β > 1 is a predefined parameter
that controls the quality of the watermarked image at the
seller side. The WCA sends the ciphertext EB(αβ̂W) to the
buyer, and ES(V) to the seller respectively. (In order to speed
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Buyer B Seller S WCA
(1) Request
(2) Request, hS
(3a) εB(αβ̂W)
(3b) εS(V)
(4) Y1, hS
Y1
Y2
V, ̂W
Figure 1: Our proposed watermarking protocol. Y1 is the seller’s
copy, and Y2 is the buyer’s copy. EB(·) is a hybrid encryption [23]
with the public key of buyer. hS is the fingerprint of the original
image, and it is signed by the seller (the signature is not shown here).
up encryption/decryption, a hybrid algorithm [23] is used
to produce ES(V): WCA generates a random session key K ,
then encrypts K with the seller’s public key, and encrypts
the watermark V with the session key K . A similar process
is applied to produce EB(̂W).)
(4) The seller decrypts ES(V) to extract V. Next he inserts
V into the cover image X to produce his watermarked copy
Y1 = X + αV = X + α(W + β̂W). The seller sends Y1 and hS
to the buyer.
(5) The buyer decrypts EB(αβ̂W) with her private key to
obtain αβ̂W, then she generates her watermarked copy
Y2 = Y1 − αβ̂W = X + α
(
W + β̂W
)− αβ̂W = X + αW.
(2)
Afterwards, the buyer will reconstruct the fingerprint hB of
Y2. Due to the invisibility property of watermarking, the
original image is only manipulated slightly. Hence, hS should
match the fingerprint hB at a very high probability. Thus,
if hS /= hB, the buyer rejects the watermarked image Y2 and
complains to the WCA.
2.3. Identification protocol
Whenever the seller finds a suspicious copy Y = Y2 + αD,
where D is a distortion due to whatever reasons, he tests the
copy with the buyer’s message V based on the method in [5].
Specifically, he checks whether
γS = (Y−X)•V
α
= (W + D)•(W + β̂W)
≈ 1 + D•(W + β̂W)
≈ 1 +  > ηS
(3)
for some predefined threshold ηS, where  is a small number.
Thus, the seller will accuse the buyer if γS > ηS. If there are
more than one potential traitor, the seller may target the one
with the largest γS.
2.4. Dispute resolving protocol
In case the buyer denies that an unauthorized copy orig-
inated from her version of the image, the seller asks the
WCA (for simplicity, we assume that the WCA is also the
arbitrator.) to resolve the dispute. Since the WCA calculates
the correlation value with W instead of V according to (4),
smaller noise is involved in WCA’s detection. Hence the
WCA’s decision is final:
γW = (Y−X)•W
α
= (W + D)•W
≈ 1 + D•W
≈ 1 + ′ > ηW ,
(4)
where ′ is small since D and W are independent.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we analyze the proposed protocol with
regards to customer’s right, traitor tracing, and performance.
3.1. Parameter selection
The present scheme has to select some parameters, especially
α and β. α is used to control the quality of the watermarked
image generated by buyer, and β is used to prevent the seller
from framing the buyer. For the sake of security, both α and
β are unknown to the buyer. Based on (8) in Section 3.2,
β = 10 is enough since the interference noise can reduce the
quality of watermarked image 20 dB. The other parameters
for threshold values (e.g., ηS for seller’s detection and ηW for
arbitrator’s detection) can be decided based on the security
requirement.
3.2. Frame-resilience
Since the seller knows the image Y1 which is watermarked
with both W and ̂W, an accused buyer may argue that she
has been framed by the buyer. Fortunately, the watermarked
image Y1 that the seller possesses is of low quality due to
the large amount of noise α(W + β̂W), so it is not worth to
protect the watermarked image Y1 at all. To demonstrate the
fidelity of the watermarking, let us measure the distortion
mean squared error (MSE) σ1 and σ2 of the watermarked
images Y1 and Y2:
σ1 =
∥
∥Y1 −X
∥
∥
2 = ∥∥α(W + β̂W)∥∥2 ≈ α2(1 + β2), (5)
σ2 =
∥
∥Y2 −X
∥
∥
2 = ‖αW‖2 ≈ α2. (6)
Therefore, the diﬀerence ΔPSNR in peak signal-to-noise ratio
(PSNR) [24] between Y1 and Y2 is
ΔPSNR = PSNR2 − PSNR1
= 10log10
σ1
M
− 10log10
σ2
M
(7)
= 10log10
(
α2
(
1 + β2
)
M
)
− 10log10
(
α2
M
)
= 10log10
(
1 + β2
)
> 20log10β (dB),
(8)
whereM is the number of pixels in the image. To achieve high
robustness, Cox’s watermarking method in (1) is performed
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in frequency domain, thus, (5) and (6) are calculated in
frequency domain. However, PSNR is defined in spatial
domain. We are still able to calculate the diﬀerence in PSNR
with (7) though, because the MSE in spatial domain is equal
to that in frequency domain. According to (8), the quality
of the watermarked image Y1 is much lower than that of
Y2. Therefore, the buyer is willing to execute the second
embedding so as to reduce the embedding noise. Since Y1 is
of very low quality, the seller has no reason to frame a buyer
with such a poor-quality image.
3.3. Detecting malicious buyer
The identification protocol in Section 2.3 can detect a traitor
if she follows the protocol faithfully. However, a malicious
buyer may attempt to defeat the protocol by exploiting
knowledge of the watermarked image Y1 and her watermark
̂W. For instance, the buyer selects a random sequence Z over
a distribution with mean 1, and generates a new watermark
αβ̂W′ which is close to αβ̂W:
Z = {zi | i = 1, 2, . . . ,n
}
,
̂W = {ŵi | i = 1, 2, . . . ,n
}
,
αβ̂W′ def= {ŵ′i | ŵ′i = zi
(
αβ ŵi
)
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,n}.
(9)
Then, she calculates
Y′2 = Y1 − αβ̂W′ = X + α
(
W + β̂W− β̂W′). (10)
If the seller finds an illegal Y′2, he will check it with (3) as
γS =
(
Y′2 −X
)•V
α
= (W + β̂W− β̂W′)•(W + β̂W)
= 1 + β2 − β̂W′•(W + β̂W)
= 1 + β2 − β2 ̂W′•̂W.
(11)
Clearly, the correlation value γS is a random variable which
depends on variable Z. Since αβ is unknown to the buyer, zi
should be selected by the buyer in a small interval [1−ε, 1+ε].
Therefore, the expected value of γS is
E
(
γS
) = E(1 + β2 − β2 ̂W′•̂W) = 1 + β2 − β2 = 1. (12)
In contrast, the expected correlation value γ′′S of an
innocent buyer with watermark pair (W′′,̂W′′) is
V′′ = W′′ + β̂W′′,
E
(
γ′′S
) = E
(
(
Y′2 −X
)•V
′′
α
)
= E((W + β̂W− β̂W′)•(W′′ + β̂W′′))
= −E(̂W′•(W′′ + β̂W′′)) = 0.
(13)
Thus, a traitor can be identified at a high probability, while
an innocent buyer has a very low probability of being accused
wrongly.
Table 1: Performance comparison.
MW [11] LYTC [15] Present
MSE σ 2α2 2α2 α2
Seller time tS n(Te + Tm) n(Te + Tm) Td
Buyer time tB nTd nTd + Tsk Td
WCA time tW nTe nTe 2Te
Seller overhead CS nlN nlX + nlN nlX + lN
WCA overhead CW nlN nlN 2nlW + 2lN
Te : the computation time for an asymmetric encryption.
Td : the computation time for an asymmetric decryption.
Tm: the computation time for a modular multiplication
Tsk : the computation time for generating a pair of public/private key.
Tsk  Td .
n: the number of DCT coeﬃcients to be manipulated.
lX : the size of one image element xi.
lN : the size of a RSA modulus N .
lW : the size of one watermark element wi.
Table 2: Example performance comparison
MW [11] LYTC [15] Present
Seller time (millisecond) 1800 1800 4.77
Buyer time (millisecond) 47700 48177 4.77
WCA time (millisecond) 1800 1800 0.36
3.4. Performance comparison
In this subsection, we compare our protocol with the
earlier protocols in [11, 15], in terms of computation
cost and communication overhead. Here, Mul-RSA denotes
the protocols in [11, 15]. Table 1 gives the comparative
performance among the protocols. In the table, the first row
indicates the quality degradation of the final watermarked
image Y2 with reference to the original image X. Clearly,
our method (in (6)) produces watermarked images of better
quality than that achievable by [11] or [15], with the same
parameter α.
In the previous schemes [11, 15], each element is
processed independently, thus the computation cost and
overhead increase linearly with the number n of the manip-
ulated elements. In contrast, our protocol which employs the
hybrid scheme [23] has only one asymmetric operation at
the seller/buyer, and two asymmetric operations at the WCA.
Correspondingly, the communication overhead is almost
constant. As a result, our scheme is much more eﬃcient in
terms of computation cost (rows 3–5) and communication
overhead (rows 6-7). Roughly, the earlier schemes are n times
slower while generating lN /lX times more network traﬃc.
To illustrate the performance diﬀerences, we use typical
parameter settings lX = 64, lN = 1024, lW = 32, and
n = 10000. Since symmetric cipher (e.g., AES/RC4) is much
faster (over 1000 times) than asymmetric cipher (e.g., RSA-
1024), we can ignore the computation time of symmetric
encryption/decryption. According to the experiment in [25]
with Pentium IV 2.1 GHz processor running Windows XP,
Te = 0.18 millisecond, Td = 4.77 millisecond, Tsk ≈ 100Td =
477 millisecond. As shown in Table 2, the protocols of [11,
15] are almost 360 times slower than our scheme at the seller,
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Figure 2: Identifying the “honest” buyer by the seller. The seller
tests the buyers with the watermark V according to (3).
and 10000 times slower at the buyer. The latter diﬀerentiation
is particularly critical for buyers that use portable devices
with limited computing and communication resources.
We should also clarify that the proposed protocol has the
disadvantage that the WCA (or seller) has to record all the
watermarks W (or V, resp.) associated to each transaction,
whereas in [15] only seller records the watermarks, and WCA
is memoryless.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the following experiments, we set α = 20, β = 10, and
the size of the test images to 200 × 200. The normalized
watermarks W and ̂W are of length n = 1000. For each
8× 8 DCT block, 16 coeﬃcients are selected for embedding.
Thus, each watermark is embedded with the repetition r =
(200 × 200/8 × 8) × 16/n = 10 to achieve robustness in
detection.
As our protocol aims to protect customer’s right, it
employs Cox’s embedding method [5] twice and hence
produces the watermarked images Y1 and Y2. The entire
watermarking process includes the following steps. (1) The
WCA produces watermarks W and ̂W. (2) The seller
performs DCT on the original image X, embedding V =
W +β̂W into X in the DCT domain, IDCT, and round IDCT
output into integer interval [0, 255] to produce Y1. (3) The
buyer executes DCT on Y1, embedding β̂W into Y1 in DCT
domain, IDCT, and round IDCT output to produce Y2.
The following experiment results indicate that our
protocol has little side-eﬀect to the underlying embedding
method in terms of robustness and invisibility.
4.1. Detecting “honest” traitor
To verify the detection method in Section 2.3, assume 400
watermark pairs (W,̂W) are generated by the WCA, and
assigned to 400 buyers. We generate a watermarked image
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Figure 3: Identifying the “honest” buyer by the WCA. The WCA
traces the traitor with the watermark W according to (4).
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Figure 4: Identifying the malicious buyer by the seller. The seller
tests the buyers with the watermark V according to (3).
Y2 with the watermarks of the 200th buyer according to
(3). The seller then calculates the correlation values γS with
(3). Figure 2 illustrates the correlation values at the seller. It
shows clearly that the 200th buyer is the traitor.
Similarly, Figure 3 shows the detection result of the WCA
with (4). The WCA confirms that the 200th buyer is indeed
the traitor.
4.2. Detecting malicious buyer
As mentioned in Section 3.3, a malicious buyer may use (10)
instead of (3) to create a pirated copy. Assume that the buyer
selects zi uniformly from (0.9, 1.1) with mean 1. Since the
watermark ̂W′ is close to ̂W, her watermarked image will be
of good quality. If such a pirated copy is found, the seller
calculates the correlation value γS based on (3). Figure 4
illustrates the detection results by the seller for the traitor and
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Figure 5: Identifying the malicious buyer by the WCA. The WCA
traces the traitor with the watermark W according to (4).
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Figure 6: PSNR of Y1 and Y2.
innocent users. Similarly, Figure 5 is the detection result γW
from WCA according to (4).
As with “honest” traitors, the malicious buyer will be
identified by the seller and WCA according to Figures 4
and 5. Therefore, the traitor is accused correctly while other
buyers are not framed despite the traitor modifying the
watermarking method. This experiment result is in concert
with our analysis in (12) and (13).
4.3. Comparing PSNR of watermarked image
To demonstrate the diﬀerent quality of the watermarked
images, we now test a group of images. Figure 6 shows the
PSNRs of the watermarked images, and Figure 7 shows a
portion of the watermarked images Y1 and Y2. It is clear that
(a) 38.05 dB (b) 56.97 dB
(c) 38.07 dB (d) 54.86 dB
(e) 38.03 dB (f) 54.97 dB
(g) 38.11 dB (h) 54.17 dB
Figure 7: The watermarked images generated by the seller (left
column) and buyer (right column), respectively.
the PSNR of Y1 is 16 dB lower than that of Y2; (due to integer
transform, the experimental ΔPSNR is smaller than that in
(8)), this confirms that it is pointless for the seller to frame
the buyer with Y1.
5. CONCLUSION
Since the buyer-seller protocols in [11, 15] employed the
homomorphic property of public key cryptosystem to
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encrypt each image element (i.e., DCT coeﬃcient), they
incur large computation costs and increase the size of the
intermediate (encrypted) images (i.e., the first watermarked
image). To overcome these shortcomings, we propose a
watermark management solution that preserves the func-
tionality in [11, 15], but is much more eﬃcient in terms
of computation cost and communication overhead. Another
advantage is that watermarked images generated by our solu-
tion have significantly higher quality than that achievable by
[11] or [15].
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